Launch HN: Alter (YC S25) – Access control for multi-user agents
Posted by simfinii 1 day ago
Hi HN! We’re Srikar and Kevan, founders of Alter – https://alterauth.com/. We’re building access control for agents that can take actions on behalf of multiple users.
If you’ve built an internal agent people use through Slack, you may have experienced this scenario: everyone signs in with their own account, but the agent connects to the CRM or billing system with one shared API key, so the agent can do anything that the key can do. User-level authentication in Slack does nothing to control what the agent can do in an external system like the CRM or billing system.
Here’s what Alter does:
-It acts as a proxy and manages downstream credentials for every API request that an agent takes;
-It takes identity into account for every action the agent does. Automatically take into account the end user identity of the person that the agent is taking actions on behalf of.
-It enforces fine grained runtime policies and records compliance grade audit logs.
Here’s a demo video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ZqPU14ipGE
We started this because we saw first hand how hard it is to build agents in regulated industries. To unlock the true benefits of agents we need to allow agents to take actions, sometimes actions on behalf of end users. I (Srikar) was working at Goldmans and I saw how prohibitively expensive it was for me as a developer to write my own custom auth to enable multi-tenancy in agents and to allow agents to have strict policy controls as they act on behalf of end users. My co-founder, Kevan, is a second time founder and was previously working on a database startup. He has experience building and selling deep tech into highly regulated environments. So this problem seemed like a natural fit for the both of us.
Building and maintaining custom auth for multi tenant agents was challenging. But so was ensuring that the solution we developed was secure, scalable and keeping track of security grade audit logs. As a result we realized there needs to be a separate product category for this that enables developers to easily build secure multi user agents that can actually take actions in an enterprise. Some of the real-world use cases we’ve seen include:
We have built a multi user open claw for our own team using Alter that saved us countless hours on our GTM effort. Link here:https://github.com/AlterAIDev/openclaw-alter-plugin
We have multiple startups who have used our platform to build their own secure internal agents for everything ranging from SRE agents to back office agents dealing with Quickbooks and payroll platforms like Rippling. It has saved developers countless hours both in terms of building and maintenance. We also have a defense contractor building air gapped agents for marine corp using Alter.
Under the hood, the value that we provide is that we do a lot of the plumbing that no one wants to do. We support hundreds of providers, all manually tested end to end. Reliability is our biggest priority. We have built this in a way to allow developers to custom build their agents however they see fit. Everything ranging from custom policies, agent delegation, user attribution, audit logs needed for compliance to a LLM gateway with guardrails (Coming soon)
Building a security product is hard. We have learnt that in order to build a truly secure product, security thinking has to pervade every part of the development process. We have embraced shift left security. Every PR that is pushed out is continuously checked for supply chain attacks, potentially dangerous code patterns etc.
Our business plan revolved around usage based pricing. There is a free tier up to 10k requests and then a pricing tier starting beyond that. We would love it if people configured their APIs and OAuth credentials, tried out the policies and actually built agents that can take actions with alter!
If you’ve built an agent that acts for multiple users, how are you handling permissions today? We’d especially like to hear what you’ve had to build yourself.
Comments
Comment by souvik1997 1 day ago
One aspect of multi-user agent security, which I think is underexplored, is how context from a higher-privileged session might "leak" into a lower privileged session. Suppose the CEO of a company uses your shared openclaw agent and the agent writes sensitive data (investor emails, for example) to its memory. My understanding is this is not protected by Alter. Then a contractor uses the same agent and can read that same memory. It seems to me that a better agent harness for this kind of multi-user use case is needed; the standard ones like openclaw and claude code simply are not designed for it. Would love your thoughts!
Comment by simfinii 1 day ago
Feel free to go through the docs here if you have more questions: https://docs.alterauth.com/guides/propagate-identity-to-memo...
Comment by Melatonic 17 hours ago
Comment by simfinii 17 hours ago
Comment by souvik1997 1 day ago
Comment by simfinii 17 hours ago
Comment by ptkachykby 18 hours ago
I am the founder of Substrate, a project that lets you inspect what is in the memory and select what each agent sees.
Do you separate memory per user with your harness?
Comment by simfinii 18 hours ago
Comment by luis_valerio 14 hours ago
How do you handle an agent that has valid authorization but has been prompt-injected?
Comment by kdodhia 14 hours ago
We assume you can't reliably stop the model from being prompt injected. So nothing is enforced at the model layer. Enforcement happens at the proxy, which sits between the agent and the downstream API and is the only thing holding the credential. The agent never sees the key, so an injected agent can't bypass it or route around the deterministic policy.
For irreversible actions you stack three things:
1. Method/endpoint restrictions. "This agent may only GET under /instances/*" means a DELETE never reaches the provider. For infra agents we'd push read-only by default and allowlist the few mutations you need.
2. Human-in-the-loop on the dangerous ops. Approval can be required conditionally: on DELETE, on specific operations, or when a parameter matches (resource outside the allowed set, etc). The request is frozen server-side, so what the approver sees is exactly what executes. The agent can't swap the payload after the yes.
3. Audit logs on every call, including denials, with the agent and end-user identity attached. So you can see the agent tried a DELETE it wasn't allowed, on whose behalf, and with what body.
Basically we treat every call like a compromised laptop: don't assume it behaves, scope the credential, and gate the risky actions behind a second party. Would love to hear more about your setup.
Comment by avikonduru 1 day ago
Comment by simfinii 1 day ago
Comment by verdverm 17 hours ago
This seems like a bad idea to me these days. Companies doing this make themselves a target and then get hacked like OpenCode. Customer accounts get drained or bills run up.
Run your own gateway behind a firewall / vpn. I personally use GoModel + Tailscale.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50133401 (OpenCode hacked story)
Comment by yaoke259 12 hours ago
Comment by simfinii 9 hours ago
The real value of alter comes in when you want to give your agents access to end users credentials. When agents act on behalf of end user as a developer you have to manage multiple credentials and more importantly manage the mapping relationship between end user identity and the credentials.
Also, as agents take actions the problem of non deterministic actions become more pronounced. With alters policy guardrails any chance of actions taking negative actions is mitigated.
Lastly, the full compliance trails of what the agent has done ends up being quite valuble especially as agents take more autonomus actions!
Comment by jeswin 8 hours ago
For a security-centric product, how would I trust your fully vibe-coded product if I can't see the source code?
Comment by simfinii 7 hours ago
We are currently in the process being fully SOC2 compliant and have gotten pen tested twice from two different companies and have found no issues. You can explore the full extent of our security process and pen test results here : trust.alterauth.com
Separately would say it is a bad assumption to make that a product is vibe coded without trying it out. As mentioned in the post we adopted a lot of security processes as a part of our SDLC including consistent scans for supply chain attacks, and static code scanners (SAST).
We also do a pen test at a yearly cadence
Comment by jeswin 6 hours ago
You've put it behind a very typical AI-generated UI; like the many that come up every day. In your case, it's an auth product and it matters more. Besides, It's difficult to try your product without handing you the keys to the kingdom.
> We are currently in the process being fully SOC2 compliant
You're getting a Type I attestation first, I presume? That is of limited value in itself, and is mostly about getting to Type II. If you already have Type I complted, you could mention that on the website. "Regulated industries" have long sales cycles and evaluations, and you'll find it difficult to start those conversations without a more reassuring website.
Comment by simfinii 3 hours ago
Regarding SOC2, in the process of getting SOC2, Type 2 compliant. As you may know there is 3 month waiting period before the auditors give a SOC2 certification so currently in the waiting period for that
Comment by 911viper 1 day ago
Comment by simfinii 1 day ago
The right way to treat the agent is not as a delegated agent but rather as a stand alone agent with its own permissions and privleges.
In scenarios where an agent and humans are peers we recommend giving separate agent identities to the agent and treat them as separate privileged users and give them permissions based on their identity and not based on the identities of the users in the channel.
We support standlone agent identities that dont require end users as the principals. Can read about that here: https://docs.alterauth.com/guides/give-an-agent-scoped-acces...
Comment by 911viper 1 day ago
Comment by 911viper 1 day ago
Comment by tomhow 3 hours ago
Comment by mauvehed 18 hours ago
Comment by simfinii 18 hours ago
We have also gotten pen tested 2 separate times and have found no issues. You can find the result of one of the pen tests on the trust center