Police officer investigated for using AI to 'create evidence' in multiple cases
Posted by austinallegro 3 days ago
Comments
Comment by sveme 3 days ago
Comment by AnthonyMouse 3 days ago
That's before getting into the practical problems with securing the keys. Every camera by every manufacturer has keys in it and the attacker only needs one key from one camera, and they get to choose the model? Creating something premised on needing to trust something with such a high probability of being compromised is worse than nothing, because it allows the ensuing forgeries a mechanism to pass themselves off as "signed" "real" images.
Comment by gorgoiler 3 days ago
…the signature included the depth measured by the autofocus system across the image?
…or a tiny stereo image was included to capture depth?
…or a mini video in the ten seconds before and after the photo was taken?
…and the key is in a tamper proof HSM?
…and the key is deleted the moment the camera detects the case being taken apart?
I know that it is a losing battle to try to build such hardware when offline attackers have essentially infinite time to dismantle even the most elaborate systems — no such thing as an un breakable safe, only how long it takes to break into it, etc — but I feel these are valid counter measures, are they not?
Comment by bArray 3 days ago
I would add a few more measures:
* Keys are regenerated for each device in the charging dock and are only valid until next recharge or a timeout.
* There is a sign-out process for the cameras that ties them to the operator.
* Police officers have no control over when the camera is recording, the camera instead controls this.
* Lower resolution data is streamed and synced to a cloud in real time, along with interesting data such as GPS, local BT/WiFi devices, etc.
As for privacy, British police are using more and more evasive camera technology out in public spaces, it's about time they were forced to wear it themselves. I want even the pencil pushers in the offices to be forced to wear it.
Comment by AnthonyMouse 2 days ago
> or a tiny stereo image was included to capture depth?
These systems work by having multiple sensors to use for depth perception, so enterprising hackers write software to create two images, one for each sensor, and put some kind of lens or mirror in front of the camera to direct a different image/screen to each sensor.
The problem is fundamentally that the device is taking unsigned analog attacker-controlled input and then signing it, and is being mass produced. So whatever you're having it do, they put something that generates the same photon pattern in front of the device and you can't fix that with cryptography.
You can probably make it so that a cheap camera needs a few hundred dollars in optical glass or similar, and expensive camera needs a few thousand dollars worth, but it's hard to see how you could make it infeasible to anyone with non-trivial resources and it's also easy to mess up even worse and make it practical even for anyone with a computer and a high resolution screen or two.
> or a mini video in the ten seconds before and after the photo was taken?
Which does what if nothing in the image is expected to be moving, or the thing you're pointing the camera at is a screen rather than a piece of paper?
Also, now to verify the signature on your 50kB image you need a 2MB video? Then by default people won't distribute images that have the ability to be verified.
> and the key is in a tamper proof HSM?
Someone figures out a timing attack on the HSM or similar and now you can extract the keys from every device of that model. Happens over and over, the chances of every device getting this right are essentially zero.
> and the key is deleted the moment the camera detects the case being taken apart?
They get multiple cameras of the same model, take one apart to see how the detection works, then having figured out how it works, take the other one apart without triggering it. Or they extract the key without ever removing the case.
Also, now your phone is going to delete its keys when you remove the case to replace the battery or a cracked screen etc., or if the detection system has a false positive? Then you need some way to transfer new keys to a thing that hasn't got any, which is an even worse attack vector than not deleting the keys to begin with.
Comment by sveme 1 day ago
Out of curiosity, what would be your proposal for identifying GenAI images and videos? Any suggestions?
Comment by totetsu 3 days ago
Comment by aiisjustanif 3 days ago
Comment by jappgar 3 days ago
If "signed" photos were treated as incontrovertible truth, then you'll just have people 3d printing hyper realistic masks or something.
Comment by sveme 1 day ago
Comment by notyourwork 3 days ago
Comment by Iolaum 3 days ago
Comment by sudonem 3 days ago
Did the defense use some sort of tool to debunk? Was it just an obvious deepfake etc? Or was it the officer’s ineptitude that got him caught?
Comment by amelius 3 days ago
Comment by otherme123 3 days ago
I can picture a cop fabricating images that are obvious, even with a watermark included, while totally convinced that it is undetectable.
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Comment by thih9 3 days ago
Which makes sense but still, ffs.
Comment by bobthepanda 3 days ago
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Comment by altmanaltman 3 days ago
Humans are flawed but that doesn't mean everyone in the jury thinks TV is real.
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Comment by ChrisMarshallNY 3 days ago
Took about six months for someone to crack the hash.
Comment by deepserket 3 days ago
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Comment by ChrisMarshallNY 3 days ago
I suspect that the cops wouldn’t like the chain public, though.
Comment by Terr_ 3 days ago
An attacker altering the ledger would still require compromising an unreasonably large number of independent groups at once, and even then the rest would be able to clearly see that some unusual and suspicious event occurred.
By limiting membership a bunch of problems simply vanish, like long-clearing times, wasting hardware on mining, vulnerability to foreign botnets, etc.
[0] A blockchain is distinguished by its core requirement, from which a cascade complexity flows: Uncontrolled node membership. Don't be fooled by people pitching "private blockchain", its a contradiction in terms designed to rehabilitate hype, like "multi-sample Theranos test" or a bicycle as "Segway passively stabilized inline wheel model."
Comment by girvo 3 days ago
Comment by dindunuf 3 days ago
Comment by teravor 3 days ago
if it is mandated that every photo or video taken for the possible use in evidence is notarized at the time of acquisition, any fabrication would necessitate total premeditation. that is, the fabricators would need to know ahead of time what they were pursuing and what evidence they would need. this seems like a very costly barrier.
for example, altering security footage would require some fantastical elements: a real-time system of ingesting real footage and altering it in real-time to slip it into the notarization pipeline within the error margins.
requiring that any equipment that produces acceptable evidence stream commitment hashes in real-time to public append-only repositories would be an enormous step forward.
Comment by EPWN3D 3 days ago
Comment by ChrisMarshallNY 3 days ago
I think it was a fairly well-known technique.
Comment by XorNot 3 days ago
Signing digital data with hardware secure tokens is a commodity capability in the iPhone many of HNs users are reading this site with.
Comment by ChrisMarshallNY 3 days ago
You’re probably right. This is easy, basic stuff that any recent college grad can do with their eyes closed.
Comment by dzhiurgis 3 days ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Authenticity_Initiativ...
Comment by XorNot 3 days ago
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Comment by aorloff 3 days ago
But I don't know of a cryptographic mechanism to ensure that a digital image is not more recent than a particular time
Comment by dspillett 3 days ago
Many (most?) blockchain mechanisms include a timestamp in each transaction on the chain, so while multiple records from the same owner prove little (the timestamps could be faked over a given period of time) the interaction with the wider network and the chain would give some confidence that the record happened between within a small amount of time.
The other possibility, that doesn't require a chain with many independent active participants, is to have things signed by an external trusted authority. Submit a hash of the content and appropriate metadata to them, and have them sign it with a signing timestamp. I've considered abusing ACME certificates for document signing like that: the hash of content (or some signature based upon it) becomes the subdomain to sign¹ and you get a certificate that even after expiry is evidence that the CA saw that value at the signing timestamp. Note of the signing will also be in the public certificate transparency log. This wouldn't, on its own, prove anything about the authenticity of the content, that could have been doctored before signing, but it does prove that the content+metadata existed at that time (so might be more useful in copyright claim type cases, or agreed contract situations where all parties have signed the content and the signatures are included in the metadata, than for proving authenticity).
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[1] based64²-ed with non-alphanumeric characters removed and truncated³ to fit or split, so acodha3sf7whsrhtqestkabtx0b4bbhyveee0ajnrpqcuxrjjvmhsujgcex.domain.tld or acodha3sf7whsrhtqestkabtx0b4bbhyveee0ajnrpqcuxrjjvmhsujgcex.w5jmmkpmyfgshx2jecsfordpnq.domain.tld
[2] names not being case-sensitive drops some of the entropy, if that is a concern use a 32-bits-per-character encoding instead and have names twice as long
Comment by aorloff 13 hours ago
Comment by dspillett 7 hours ago
A TXT record may be used in the signing process if using DNS verification, but you are getting a certificate for the name overall so using an A record to hold the hash you are looking to certify does the trick, then if you want to use HTTP-01 for verification rather than an extra DNS record you can.
Comment by gcr 3 days ago
The image contains the previous block’s hash.
Wouldn’t this establish both a lower bound and an upper bound on the time the image could have been produced?
Comment by bigiain 3 days ago
Back when I was on Twitter and following a lot of infosec accounts, it was quite common to see tweets that were just a hash. Sometimes they'd have an explanation "Zero click RCE in Android 10 - {hash}"
In the past I've used gmail for this internally - email a hash of something critical (logs, configurations, decision docs, etc) to a dedicated gmail account - relying on the in feasibility of "faking" the date/time once it's onb Google's servers.
The important thing here would be to make sure those hashes are published somewhere where its technically infeasible for the police to change it after the fact, so not on a platform the police run or p-aid for (or that is run or paid for by an organization that the police can request or coerce the operators to make changes).
Comment by XorNot 3 days ago
As a community service you need them to have enough scale that no individual hash or source can be tampered with without being likely to become known as unreliable to everyone else as well ala certificate transparency records.
(You could probably just bootstrap let's encrypt for this - issuing a certificate you use to sign a bunch of data would stamp several minimums on the order anything could have happened).
Comment by catlikesshrimp 3 days ago
That would be a use case for a block chain. But I still don't understand how you are securing the integrity of the validity of the certificate stating the authenticity of the media. I only understand you are stamping media with a "at least as old as [timestamp]
Comment by 3eb7988a1663 3 days ago
[0] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/interoperable-randomness-beac...
Comment by Dwedit 3 days ago
Embedding a public random number also doesn't resist tampering, unlike signed timestamps.
Comment by aorloff 3 days ago
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Comment by __del__ 3 days ago
Comment by thewebguyd 3 days ago
We are quickly going to reach a point where any photo or video taken on a smartphone is inadmissible by default.
Comment by asdff 3 days ago
Comment by Arodex 3 days ago
- the whole roll of negatives was prime evidence;
- police forces were one of the biggest users of Polaroid instant film.
And moreover, who had a darkroom and the skills to edit substantially a picture?
Whereas here we have nobodies being able to generate pixel-perfect fake "evidence" from the computers they already have.
Comment by asdff 3 days ago
https://www.metmuseum.org/exhibitions/objects/objects@exhibi...
The roll itself can be manipulated too. Most of the techniques used in modern photoshop are basically 1:1 carry overs of darkroom processes. Layers, dodge and burn, masking, etc.
There was a time you could take this class in highschool.
Comment by Arodex 3 days ago
Have fun keeping making bad faith arguments alone.
Comment by asdff 2 days ago
Comment by themafia 3 days ago
What makes evidence "pixel perfect?" What digital photographs don't have to involve a chain of custody? Literally the first question the defense will ask is "how did you get this picture." If you say you pulled from a security system they can just go ask for the originals. This happens all the time.
Where people are getting confused is it's almost never _one_ piece of evidence that's used to convict you; although, it may be a single piece of evidence which convinces your attourney to railroad you into a plea deal.
Comment by Arodex 3 days ago
https://rangefinderforum.com/threads/gentlemen%E2%80%93and-c...
Comment by mukbangpervert 3 days ago
I get that there is a certain type of moron who thinks that the collapse in cost of misinformation has no harm... but all you've done is announce to the world that you are a moron.
Comment by asdff 3 days ago
It always comes down to provenance.
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Comment by testing22321 3 days ago
Surely it’s just a matter of time.
Comment by defrost 3 days ago
Meta, for one, is keen to bury such things and avoid responsibility for ad contents: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-17/andrew-forrest-battle...
Comment by pjc50 3 days ago
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Comment by WarOnPrivacy 3 days ago
[The Derbyshire Police] declined to give more detail
about what the evidential material consisted of.
The term [evidential material] can be used to
describe witness statements.Comment by wahern 3 days ago
The loophole is all the powers the police and government have to more-or-less punish someone before a trial, or even before charges.
Comment by warumdarum 3 days ago
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Comment by roryirvine 3 days ago
If found guilty at trial, they'd be looking at a prison sentence as the abuse of position aspect would automatically mean high culpability. Expected starting point would be 4 years if an innocent person has been charged or convicted on the basis of the false evidence (which is implied by the report). Perhaps 6-7 years if multiple people have been. Very unlikely they'd ever be able to work in policing or related fields again.
Comment by Eddy_Viscosity2 3 days ago
Comment by constableclaude 3 days ago
Regardless of what they did, tampering with evidence is completely unacceptable and should result in their dismissal and conviction but I don’t think the story will transpire to be as attention grabbing. A well meaning idiot could convince themselves that enhancing evidence is somehow justifiable whereas it would be almost impossible for even the most corrupt moron to justify creating evidence out of thin air.
Creating evidence out of thin air would be ridiculous because evidence is available to the defence who would be able to immediately identify if an image or video had been created (as the defendant would be able to recognize what they do or did not do) whereas “enhancing” an image could be easily spotted by other officers. “How come this photo is clearer than the last time I saw it?” “Oh I ran it through ChatGPT to clean it up! Neat, eh? Just like on CSI!”
Comment by xorcist 3 days ago
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Comment by dofm 3 days ago
The word of a police officer, in UK law, is that of any other witness. There is a kind of presumption of regularity in the courts, but they don't have any sense of qualified immunity; they are generally but not universally considered not personally liable for negligence but that is not guaranteed them.
And unlike police departments in the USA they don't really have much latitude to experiment with technology. IMO they should be banned from using AI tools that aren't centrally provided.
Other than that, yes — I agree with your general view that this is an alarming state of affairs for people in a position of trust.
Comment by totetsu 3 days ago
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Comment by hiddencost 3 days ago
Here's a couple fun examples:
https://www.wgbh.org/news/local/2026-06-05/boston-law-enforc...
https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/la-is-investigating...
Comment by dofm 3 days ago
I think there have been less than two dozen police involved killings in the whole of the UK in the last six years, and that's in a population of seventy million people.
It's about 2% of the equivalent US figure (which averages 800 per year in 340 million people)
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Comment by Quarrelsome 3 days ago
UK police are decent at avoiding escalation as opposed to the US where they often _are_ the escalation. In England and Wales 24/25, two people died by being shot by the police. TWO. Ten year average is THREE.
Comment by tsss 3 days ago
Comment by justin66 3 days ago
Thank god that never happens anymore. I'm sure the bodycam era has ended all of that misbehavior and one could not possibly go to YouTube and find videos of cops in possession of that unique blend of corruption and stupidity that would lead them to plant drugs while being recorded. Ahem.
Comment by themafia 3 days ago
Yet we have many examples of this precise thing happening. This is because the police carry immense credibility when testifying. This is also why the "Brady List" exists.
> the defence who would be able to immediately identify if an image or video had been created
How? Just pure skill? Again, we can see from appeals court proceedings, they miss details all the time. The system of "public defense" in the United States is severely lacking.
Comment by kubb 3 days ago
Comment by Jensson 3 days ago
Doesn't iphones do this by default? The camera isn't actually that sharp, instead it fills in the details so it looks sharp, and sometimes it adds things that were never there. Can easily see it adding a gun in a blurry photo of someone.
So almost everyone uses AI to forge evidence then.
Comment by bentley 2 days ago
This seemed a plausible enough objection to me. Although a fairly techy guy, I was (and am) not familiar with the specifics of Apple image processing, but at the time I had a vague awareness that Apple had been heavily advertising its use of AI algorithms to improve the quality of images. Whether that affects zooms specifically I don’t know—but it’s not an outlandish question.
The judge did an eminently reasonable thing: he disallowed the zoomed evidence on its own, but allowed it to be re‐entered if the prosecution provided an expert witness to testify that zooming the photo didn’t meaningfully change it. For this, he was pilloried by the tech media.
Take Ars Technica, for example: they used the headline “You shall not pinch to zoom: Rittenhouse trial judge disallows basic iPad feature,” and prominently displayed the judge’s words “I know less than anyone [about technology],” as if the right thing for a judge who knows nothing about technology to do would be to determine the merits of technical evidence on his own rather than ask for an expert witness. It’s not like it would have been hard for the prosecution to find one. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/11/rittenhouse-tria...
Anyone who’s experimented with even non‐AI‐based upscalers knows that changing the algorithm can connect or disconnect catty‐cornered objects, introduce curves, and so on. I was shocked (well, not that shocked, given the heavily partisan interest in the case) that the tech media was so confident zooming an image couldn’t possibly meaningfully change it.
In the end, the image was displayed on a big‐screen TV (which probably used some other upscaling algorithm like bilinear, not that anyone in court was technical enough to point it out). The prosecution asked whether/asserted that Rittenhouse had raised his gun in the image, and Rittenhouse said it was not raised. So the exact details of how the small few pixels in the image got upscaled turned out to be pivotal in the end after all.
Comment by jshier 3 days ago
Comment by Jensson 3 days ago
This is AI. Its not generative AI if that is what you mean, but it is AI altering the image and adding things that wasn't there, usually its fine sometimes it fails horribly and make the picture totally different.
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Comment by nullc 3 days ago
My mind went straight to using the AI to write a statement and the AI made stuff up, which would be a nearly guaranteed outcome from using existing LLMs for that task, and it's exactly the sort of thing that I'm sure many officers are doing ... and it could go a fair time before it was discovered.
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Comment by cadamsdotcom 3 days ago
This is a very very intense claim, and if true, would represent a monumental institutional failure across hundreds or even thousands of disparate organizations.
Do you have any data to support your hunch?
Strong claims require strong evidence.
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Comment by pseudo0 3 days ago
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/first-death-row-exoneration-inv...
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Comment by jasonfarnon 3 days ago
How did we do that? I never heard this: certainly 10% of people on death row weren't exonerated by DNA? This is some kind of shaky extrapolation I assume?
Comment by themafia 3 days ago
It only took a few years.
They've since changed and expanded the standard "DNA loci" to compensate.
Comment by peyton 3 days ago
I disagree wrt reasonableness. It’s just too big a leap. There are a lot of crimes, and not many land you on death row.
Comment by brookst 3 days ago
Is there any argument that less-scrutinized cases would have a lower level of false convictions?
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Comment by rvnx 3 days ago
The big claim is here: the state has grandiose claims that the overwhelming majority is fair, but there is no proof of it.
Therefore the state should prove that more than 90% of the cases are legitimate, fair, not coerced, and not motivated by the pressure to interrupt the proceedings.
97% of people choose plea deals or out-of-court settlement, it is a huge amount.
It means that in real practice, not imaginary internet, people who face court consider that justice is a big machine that can crush you no matter if you are innocent or not.
In the best case you are acquitted at the end, but you are guaranteed to bear the financial burden, fear and stress as a punishment.
Being held in jail before trial is a very convincing reason to plea deal too.
It's a system engineered to make pleading the only reasonable option, no matter if you did anything or not.
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Comment by jrflowers 3 days ago
This sounds like you’re imagining how prosecutors as a group sort of feel about things, generally, and that this notion you’ve thought of outweighs the demonstrable real-world system where prosecutors are awarded for convictions, full stop.
Comment by jasonfarnon 1 day ago
Comment by CoastalCoder 3 days ago
That's the rule for criminal court in the US, but each of us is free to pick his own standard for his own purposes.
Comment by cadamsdotcom 3 days ago
It is disingenuous to weasel out of proving one claim by making another, or saying “look over here”
Also, outrageous claims in opposite directions can both be bullshit.
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Comment by Jensson 3 days ago
Even single digit percent is hard to believe, but its possible, but double digits you are talking China or Russia levels of state corruption and even there I doubt its that high.
Comment by cadamsdotcom 3 days ago
Edit; upon closer examination. I did imply in my last paragraph that your claim was outrageous. Bit of a gaffe considering I’m the agitator here. My apologies.
Comment by chaps 3 days ago
If you would like to begin trying to answer these, I recommend starting with submitting some FOIAs. Considering your stance seems to be that you won't believe what others are telling you -- I promise you that you'll be surprised.
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Comment by cadamsdotcom 3 days ago
It’s easy to say things that sound true on the surface, but even if true, it’s still irresponsible to say them on the back of a hunch.
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This is done because there's an exception in our constitution for slavery "as punishment for a crime" and well all know that capitalism loves slave labor.
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Comment by rvnx 3 days ago
aren't you an imposter ?
Comment by duped 2 days ago
Ok that's a bit aggressive, but it's important to understand the limits of forensic science, the broken incentives, and systemic lack of rigor in the application of various analyses and products to inculpate/exculpate suspects after the fact.
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Comment by dofm 3 days ago
There you go.
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Comment by dofm 3 days ago
Them being all super-keen to use AI really fits. Some pillock of an officer going too far really fits.
Derbyshire is really safe but they act like it is not.
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